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8-9 july, 2015 
 
• 1. Comparative effectiveness of low carbon 
mechanisms in power markets 
 
• 2.  Which way to monitor distributional effects? 
       A distributional problem appears after a threshold of low carbon technologies (capacity 
and energy) 
– Physical threshold at around 15% of  energy and  30-40% of capacity 
– Cost threshold:  € 10-20 milliards when total market revenues of production  around € 30-40 
billion 
– Who pays? 
  
Part One  
Effectiveness of low carbon arrangements in power markets 
 
 
Area service monopoly allowed planning and programming 
 
Monopoly License with public service obligation: geographic price equalization, social tariffs,   
 
Nationalized monopoly: industrial policies (promotion of  large sized technologies and national 
manufacturers) 
 
Optimal mix  investment (caveat : error of forecasting) 
 
Blessful era of dispatchable technologies 
 
 Tariffs aligned on average cost for all the consumers  
(eventually horo-seasonality with non linear tariffs with capacity price under the so called 
mariginalist tariff) 
Inclusion of the public service obligation  and industrial policy costs in the tariffs 
 
Eventual distributional issue :  
Some cross- subsidisation for large consuming industries  if industrail lobbying as in some 
European countries 
 
• Quite controlable if solid doctrine like LRMC tariffs in France )  
• Norm of consumer protection  ( stronger with the PUC culture in the USA than in Europe) 
 Farewell to the Useful former vertically integrated utility model  for 
dealing with public policies 
US approach to decarbonisation in power sector 
Why not the carbon price to trigger low carbon technologies 
development  (RES-E, CCS, new nuclear) or less emitting one? 
(Besides market failures in matter of learning process which was the 
rationale of subsidies on investment and on production either by tax 
credit, public subsidies and now by FIT financed by levy) 
• The Clean Power Plan’s EPA in the US proposes three options to states 
regulators 
– Cap and trade (so carbon price) 
– Baseline and credit (standard and tradable performances certificates; so 
an implicit carbon price) 
– Clean energy obligation (a general RPS) 
• So explicit confidence to carbon pricing effects with choice 1 
and choice 2 
• Possibilities of success in the USA because the transitional 
option of gas power production (not the case in the EU) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the European Union   
• Carbon tax in some countries for non ETS sector 
• ETS with grand fathering (carbon rent for the generators) 
• Then ETS with auctioning 
 
But the climate policy has de facto  annexed in the EU (the famous 
3x20) 
• the former RES-E programs based on FIT,  renewable obligation 
(equivalent to RPS in the USA) 
• the energy efficiency programs (DSM, Energy efficiency obligation , 
CERT in the UK, etc.) 
 
In fact no confidence at all in the price signal of the carbon pricing 
Overlapping of instruments (with some negative trade offs) 
 
Package of  instruments covering centralized and decentralized 
technologies 
 Two functions:  
– To add a support for non-mature technologies and  transfer the overcost onto the 
consumers 
– To transfer the main part of the risks on the consumers (or on the public budget) 
 
 
 
• Feed-in tariffs  
– presently to be replaced by different types of feed in premiums,   
–  auctioning for medium sized projects in the EU, but jsut for expose the RES-E producers to hourly 
market price  
 
• Auctioning for long term contracts for new RES-e or large sized RES-e  (France, UK, NL, DK, etc.) 
 
• Obligation of green certificates on the suppliers (UK, Sweden, Belgium, Poland) or in the past 
on producers (Italy) 
 
 
 
How to maintain incentive to control project costs and technology risks on the operators? 
 
Incentive also to efficient operations 
 
Farewell to the market regime model 
The market model with decarbonisation public policy is in first based on planning 
and then on some forms of markets 
 
• Out of market entries of RES-E (FIT,  RO/RPS, auctioning) 
 
• Need of LT arrangements for large sized low carbon technologies 
 
Only the residual system is supposed to be optimizable  by the text book approach 
 
 End use pricing 
  
• Wholesale price (sourcing costs ) +  
 uniform levy for capacity +      
 
discriminatory levy for decarbonation policy  + 
 
Possible discrimination of transmission costs  
 
So Possible huge implicit cross- subsidization (under political discretion) :  
           
Difference of end use prices  between consumers  
 
Principles Type of arrangement Autonomy let to 
generators in 
investment 
decisions 
Role of the current 
market 
Public governance 
Decentralized 
coordination: 
Price 
instrument 
Fixed  FIT 
(with obligation of purchase) 
Freedom of timing   
Orientation of choice by 
technology FITs 
No responsibility of RES 
producers on markets 
(priority access) 
1. Regulator determines 
annual payment on long 
term by technology. 
2.Tuning of FIT for new 
contracts 
Decentralized  
coordination :   
Quantity 
instrument 
Clean energy obligation on 
suppliers 
Renewables obligation 
Renewables Portfolio Standard 
(RPS) 
Freedom of timing and 
choice of technology  
  
(in fact technology 
bands) 
Responsibility of 
intermittent producers 
on balancing and energy 
markets 
Regulator definition on 
target trajectories, 
 On buy-out price, 
(penalty) 
on technology bands  
Centralized 
coordination :  
Auction for  
contracts with 
public agency 
Fixed price contracts (physical) 
Contracts for difference CfD  
(financial) 
 Variable premium FIT  
No technology 
neutrality  (issue of 
learning investment) 
Neutrality in future 
Responsibility of 
producers 
Regulator defines 
 timing of auction, 
target by technologies 
Comparison of characters of main mechanisms 
Principles Type of arrangement Advantages Limitations 
  
Decentralized 
coordination: 
Price 
instrument 
Fixed  FIT(with obligation of 
purchase) 
Simple and adaptative 
  
Effective 
1. Risk of overcapacity by 
technology 
2.Exposure to regulator capture 
risk  
3.A bit less incentive to 
operational efficiency 
        
Decentralized  
coordination 
:   
Quantity 
instrument 
Clean energy obligation 
 Renewables obligation 
 RenewablesPortfolio 
Standard (RPS) 
Less rent than with FIT 
Revelation of informations 
Total cost control by buy-out 
price 
  
Supposed to control installed 
capacity 
1.Addition of market risks 
(wholesale energy , certificate 
price                   
 2.Risk of illiquidity of 
exchanges if vertical 
arrangements       
 3.Risk of regulatory 
capture(Banding) 
4. No respect of the capa . obj. 
Centralized 
coordination 
:  
Auction for  
contracts on 
LCTs 
Fixed price contracts or 
CfD (financial contracts  
Variable premium FIT  
1.No asymmetry of information 
on price           
2.With CfD,  Revenue stability on 
long term  
(difference with fixed Premium 
FIT) 
  
Difficulty with  price reference 
for strike price 
Transaction cost  
Part 2. The monitoring of distributional effects 
– Who pays? Management  with endemic practices related to the historic norms of 
consumers protection 
 
– Development of cost containment practice 
 
The debate is not yet appeared in the US because the 
yet limited costs of the RPS and DSM in the bills 
source NREL, May 2014 
 
But great awareness to protect the consumers 
by the PUCs  
The exemplary recycling of the carbon rent in the Californian ETS 
with free allowances: 
 
Utilities receive free allowances 
But are required to auction them and rebuy it 
 Reveal the cost of the allowances to be passed through in the 
tariffs 
All auction proceeds have to be paid back by utilities to customers 
through flat “climate credits” ($35/semester in 2014) 
More than offset price increase to low-income households 
 
Who pay in Europe? 
 
Before reforms  the cost of the public service obligation and the industrial policy 
imposed to utilities was internalized in the budget of the utilities 
 
After reforms and decarbonisation polcies (ETS introduction in 2005) 
1. The carbon rent is remained in the hands of generators (even the emitting 
ones) 
       No investment at all in low carbon equipment  (CCS fro instance) 
 
2. In general small consumers (households ans SMEs)  pay in each EU-member 
for the FIT costs 
 
2 bis When it is a  RO obligation, more difficult to observe who pays  
• But alignement of the market price offers on the buy-out price penalty 
whatever the price of the certificates (in the UK and Nordic countries for 
instance) 
Who pay? 
  Germany Italy France Spain UK 
Household
s and SME 
62€/MWh 
 
Explicit in 
the bill 
36€/MWh     
SME more 
than  
households 
8 €/MWh 
for 
RES+CHP 
 
CSPE 
explicit in 
the bill 
  
Most 
charge 
than 
indus-
try 
 
 
Uniform levy to 
be added to the 
present  RO cost 
and CERT cost 
of the suppliers 
 
Non explicit in s 
contracts 
Energy 
intensive 
industries 
0.5€/MWh   
(5% of the 
total cost) 
0 ? Free tax 
threshold  
of 7 GWh/y 
The need of cost containment procedure  
  Present total costs Explicit cost 
containement 
with cap 
Payment by 
discriminatory 
levies 
Partial non 
payment of  
Germany €20 billion per year € 20 billion Yes   
Spain   
€11 billion per year  
(21% with CHP) 
 
    ? 
 
Yes ? 
 
Transformation tariff 
deficit in a restructured 
fund in 2009 ( funded by 
10% of bills) 
Tax of 7% on the 
electricity utilities (2013) 
Italy €12 billion  € 12.5 billion 
  
Yes   
France €5.5 bilion (with 
CHP ) 
Not yet Partly Govt debt to 
EDF : 2.5 billion  
          
UK 
 (without the 
Renewable 
obligation) 
 £5.3 billion £ 7.6 billion in 
2020 
Uniform levy to 
be added to the 
RO cost of the 
suppliers 
  
          
Procedures of cost containment are in development 
The UK case of the levy control  
 (Levy funded expenditures on FIT, CfDs and Warm front, but not RO, and CERT 
 
• Cost transparency (regular publication of anticipated cost) 
• Control of the increase with definition of a cap 
– Need of credible scenarios  of development of different measures to make cost anticipation 
– To test the interactions between options (for instance CfDs for large RES-E, nuclear, feed in tariff 
for small technologies) 
•  Scenarios within the cap and scenario outside the cap 
– Methods based on a model of investment choices andn market simulation (strike price) 
  
• Creation of a board for the control of expenses   but not the outcomes  
• (for instance, no advice to give about the selected CfDs and their costs) : 
 
Question mark : what would happen with  the nuclear CfDs if the cap will stay fixed in the future? 
One HP contract CfD = 4.5 billion 
 
• Some self adaptation : if above the cap, decrease of the Feed in tariffs 
 
• Could it serve as a commitment? 
 
Alternative :  to control FIT premium by a cap + limit of installation per year and techno 
(Germany, Spain) 
 
As a conclusion 
From an Institutionalist  perspective: 
The effectivenesss of a regulatory and organisational model depends upon:                   
1/ its internal consistency and     2/its coherence with the institutional environment 
(competition rules, soft laws)  (Aoki, 2004). 
 
– Is there still a consistency? 
– all the market coordinations are defintively distorted for short term and long term 
coordination 
– Increasing discrepancy between market price and LRMC/average costs 
• Illustrative case In Germany households  and SMEs pay a  RES-E levy higher than 
the energy cost 
 
No more normative reference  (compass is there but no more magnetic North) 
– Competition policy regulator likes his compass but there is no more  North 
 
A test about the redistributive question  
Second best theory (Lipsey et Lancaster, 1956) is it valuable? 
Ramsay Boiteux approach about the charge to be supported by different group of taxpayers 
or consumer groups :   charge inversly porportional to price elasticity  
 
Could it be  a justification? The magnetic North has disapppeared 
Constant exposure to lobbying  pressures and kabbalist interpretations of the competition 
law at the EU level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
